The new county government system was preceded by two
main institutions – the provincial administration and the local governments (Local
Authorities or LAs). The devolved system of government at independence with 7
regional governments and an eighth one for the city of Nairobi (famously known
as the majimbo system), It was short lived as barely a year later it was
abolished.It was replaced by the provincial administration (PA).
The geographical units comprising the regional governments became the 8
provinces – Nyanza, Central, Rift Valley, North Eastern, Eastern, Coast,
Western and Nairobi. Below the provinces were established districts, further
divided into divisions, then locations, then sub-locations and villages. At
each of these units an officer was appointed to represent the interests of the
central government. This system was akin to the colonial system that had been
used to control the populace. The political elite saw it as a key means of
consolidating power and getting up to date intelligence on any matter.
In later days the provincial administration officers
were to play a key role in the running of the ruling party – KANU. At one point
it was even difficult to distinguish the boundary between KANU officials and
government officials as each played the others role. PA officers became lords
in their areas and dictated on every matter. Anyone opposing them was seen as
an enemy of the state and acting in direct defiance of the president and was dealt
with by brute force and without any fair trial. It is this that has bred
distrust and negativity among the Kenyan people for the institution. However in
practice the administrative functions they provided have been critical
especially in the resolving of social wrongs, certification in matters of
registration of persons and property, and as agents of the government on matter
of law and order.
Also subdued under the central government were the LAs
which were put under the ministry of local government. Before the formation of
county governments there were 175 LAs. In theory the LAs were expected to be
where political, administrative and fiscal decentralization was exercised.
However, in practice they had weak system that saw the councillors elected
while their executive arm appointed by the central government thus undermining their
independence and ability to account to the public. Their limited capacity,
controlled resources and rampant corruption with impunity further undermined
them and worsened their performance. It was the abuse and failure of these two
systems that led to great agitation for a fully devolved system of government.
Through the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission)
CKRC) draft constitution, and deliberations at the National Constitutional
Conference (Bomas) and later of the
Committee of Experts (CoE), devolution emerged as a key principle of whatever
system was arrived at. Kenyans wanted to ensure that they had a say in their
local affairs and that the leaders they elected had resources and space to make
and effect their decisions. They also wanted to be able to have key services
delivered by institutions close to them. Kenyans wanted a government that is
close and effective, a government that would enable them to resolve long endured
injustices.
This desire raised the question: what kind of
structure would best deliver this? How many levels of government and how many
units at each level? And what would be the powers at each level? What would be
administratively and economically sensible so that Kenyans would not shoulder
too heavy a burden?
According
to the CoE, the key factors to consider in determining the levels, number and
size of units included the geographical features of areas in relation to the
services to be delivered; means of communication or accessibility for effective
governance; density of population; resources, including human and physical
infrastructure; social feasibility in terms of accommodating into the
administrative unit; the historical and cultural ties of communities; minority
interests; and the views of the people. While CKRC had recommended five levels
of devolved government, the CoE through its harmonized draft constitution
released to the public in November 2009 recommended three levels: National,
Regional and County governments. The counties were to be the basic unit of
devolution and there would be 79 of them based on the districts agreed in the
Bomas Draft.
The
regional governments, though not the basic units of devolution, were seen as
important as they would be large enough geographical units with substantial populations
and would accommodate ethnic and
cultural diversity and contribute to nation building; they would facilitate
coordination of county governments and planning for services that cut across
county boundaries; and they would form a productive linkage to the national
government especially for equitable allocation of resources and the protection
of the interests of devolved governments (CoE Final Report, 2010). Upon receipt
of the views from the public it was deemed better to have only two levels
largely on argument cost and simplicity of the system. There was also criticism
that the CoE had given no very clear role to the regions. Thus the regional
government level was dropped. The districts as enacted in 1992 under the
provinces and districts act were adopted as the basis of the county
governments.
What are current
structures like – number and size?
The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 establishes two levels
of government – national and county. The national government comprises the
executive, a bi-cameral parliament and judiciary. 47 County governments are
established each with an executive and legislative arm. Two main reasons seem
to have been key in adopting the 47 units. First was the need for units that
were easy to manage in terms of costs and size. One option was to have the 79
districts adopted at Bomas as the basis of counties. These were seen as too
many and economically unviable. The other option was to go for larger units
(say 25) that would mean the merging of some districts. This while making
economic and administrative sense sounded to be politically unviable given the
interests of various political groupings. Secondly was the delicate balance
between having units that are small enough to ensure effective participation
but also large enough to maximize on economies of scale of delivering key
services. As a compromise, the 47 districts, existing in 1992, before more
creation of districts of dubious constitutional validity, were adopted. This
did not require a change of names or boundaries.
The Constitution does provide a mechanism for changing
boundaries (Article 188), but this would require the recommendation of an
independent commission, and then the support of two-thirds of all the members
(not just those voting) of the National Assembly and of two-thirds of the
Senate delegations (which basically means of two-thirds of the Senators). This
will be probably hard to achieve. No change was allowed before the first elections,
which took place this year.
The 47 counties vary in every sense of the word. The
largest is Marsabit (70,961 square kilometres) and it’s also the one with the
least population density – of 4 persons per square kilometre. Mombasa is the
smallest county (219 square kilometres) after Nairobi and Vihiga which have a
size of 695 and 531 square kilometers respectively and has a density of 4292
persons per square kilometre.. The table below shows the 5 largest and 5
smallest counties. An interesting observation
is that the size of the counties also has a close correlation with population
density and poverty levels. Larger counties have high poverty incidence save
for Garissa which is just below the 50 per cent mark and they are also sparsely
populated. They are also remote and among those that have a low County
Development Index and will thus receive a share of the equalization fund (CRA,
2013). This already indicates that the cost of delivering services there will
be higher especially in terms of infrastructure than in smaller and urban
counties.
Counties by geographic size in relation to population
and poverty indicators (First and Last 5)
County
|
Marsabit
|
Turkana
|
Wajir
|
Garisaa
|
TanaRiver
|
Busia
|
Nyamira
|
Nairobi
|
Vihiga
|
Mombasa
|
Size (km2)
|
70961
|
68680
|
56686
|
44175
|
38437
|
1134
|
899
|
695
|
531
|
219
|
Population
|
291166
|
855399
|
661941
|
623,060
|
240,075
|
488,075
|
598252
|
3138369
|
554622
|
939370
|
Density (persons per km2)
|
4
|
13
|
12
|
14
|
6
|
430
|
665
|
4515
|
1045
|
4292
|
Poverty Incidence (%)
|
83.2
|
94.3
|
84.0
|
49.2
|
76.9
|
66.7
|
48.1
|
22.5
|
41.8
|
37.6
|
Source: CRA
County Factsheets, 2012
Key
characteristics of the devolved units
The
47 districts were not very different from those created, and named in colonial
times, when the rationale was to divide and rule Kenyans. People were
balkanized into ethnic blocks and pitted against each other. Others – as with
the Kalenjin, Luhya and Meru – were put together as closely related yet they
have significant dialect and sub tribe groupings. It is thus of interest that
we have adopted the same districts with an objective of fostering national
unity by recognizing diversity. With the exception of Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru
and Eldoret, most of the counties have homogenous majority communities, and
they consider the county “theirs”. Even the names of some counties correspond to
the name of the majority tribe such as Turkana, Samburu, Pokot, Nandi, Kisii,
Embu, Tharaka and Meru. This has raised concerns among minorities at county
level. These are persons from communities with smaller numbers in each county
and who fear being marginalized.
Given
that political organization in Kenya has largely been on ethnic lines, we have
started seeing possibilities of certain counties having an assembly and
executive with members from only one community. This is why certain county
assemblies will be without a single opposition member, as all persons elected
are from the dominant political party. Examples are Mombasa with all MCAs from
ODM, Kirinyaga with only one MCA from outside TNA out of 20, Kisumu and Elgeyo Marakwet where all MCAs save three
are from URP.. This presents a unique challenge for democracy in Kenya. The
constitution makes provision for law to ensure that the county government
reflects the community and cultural diversity and protection of minorities
(Art. 197). In counties like this, diversity and minority protection may only
be achieved through the party list members (often called “nominated”), for
marginalized groups and gender balance, but it is unclear how far this has
actually been achieved.
Does
it matter if a county is homogenous or not? In theory, it is argued that
homogenous sub-national units would have an easier time in agreeing on policy
priorities. On this basis, one would expect counties with greater homogeneity to
progress faster. This assumes the fact that homogeneity is also reflected in
policy and political ideology. This would be interesting to test in Kenya as – while
counties may be largely homogenous, at least ethnically, and even may have
voted for persons in the same political party – they may not hold the same
policy positions. This is because during elections, candidates do not
necessarily campaign on an agreed set of party policies but on personally
identified issues. Thus once in office, they are keen to have the promises they
made to the people accomplished even if that may be at variance with what their
party stands for. It is of course worth noting that the current devolved units
have also meant that there are no more “home” regions for the larger ethnic
communities. Good examples are the Kikuyu and the Luo who have been split into
5 counties. The inter-county competition may mean that there is less focus on
negative ethnicity. This has the potential of creating an equalizing effect
with smaller communities having a greater say in the county.
Here
in Kenya, the functionality of counties seems to have overridden concerns about
ethnic inclusivity, the latter being seen as an outcome of other factors such
as resource allocation. It has been argued that the reason Kenya has
experienced ethnic related conflicts is because one community (or group of
communities) has been denied its rightful share of the national cake by
another. Thus, goes the argument, if all matters of inequality – especially
economic and political – are addressed then the ethnic antagonism would resolve
itself. It is also why many a community want their own person to take the helm
of power at the national level so as to be able to get greater opportunities
for their areas. This has been a key argument for devolution of power to make
and distribute wealth.
The
devolved units also differ greatly in terms of natural resource endowments.
While past focus has been on agriculture production of the earlier marked
highlands, recent focus is on natural resources exploitation including precious
metals, minerals, oil and gas. Already
there is a rush to acquire land in areas thought to harbour such resources.
Other natural endowments are based on flora and fauna such as parks, mountains,
valleys, lakes, forests and jungles. These endowments and how they are utilized
will determine the progress of counties. For instance the great wildlife
potential in parts of Eastern and North Eastern of Kenya remains largely
untapped with tourism focusing on the west, central and coast of Kenya. Agricultural
potential must however not be undermined as it still holds the key to food
security and large scale employment creation. Human resource potential will
also be key differentiating factor. This is largely as a result of progress in
education access and attainment. This of course assumes that the well educated
professionals will be willing to take up jobs and invest in counties.
Assessing the
impact of the current structure
The main concern is that the 47 devolved units are far
too many for the economy of our size. Each comes complete with an executive and
assembly functions modelled against the national ones. The cost is especially in
relation to the wage bill and multiple overheads of running government. This
would even be worse should corruption take root in the counties. As to whether
counties need more money or better investment on key priorities may also determine
the costs. More money is not necessarily equal to more development.
There has been criticism of the scheme of building
devolution on the basis of sharing national revenue because it creates an
impression that there are unlimited resources held in some place that need
sharing. It is emerging that with counties wanting to control more and more
resources, counties with limited resource endowment may find it difficult to
run. This is because the national government will have less and less revenue to
share out. And those likely to be affected the most are the larger, and poorer,
counties although that may be debatable too, especially with discovery of oil
in Turkana and gas in Marsabit, as well as the great livestock potential of
these areas. A shift of focus to internal generation of wealth through
available opportunities would seem a better approach to address the economic
challenge of counties.
As for development, the 47 units present more
opportunities than challenges. The opportunities are in harnessing the
competitive advantage of the counties and especially the human and natural
resources. There is a further
opportunity in counties forming joint forums/authorities through which they can
pursue cross-cutting development goals. A challenge will be in consolidating
the support of all actors of county and national government including
institutions such as state owned enterprises and state corporations. Private
sector and civil society organizations have also built great capacity in
dealing with some key issues and hence counties would greatly benefit in
engaging them. All said, the differentiating factor between counties
development is likely to be based on human effort, investment priorities and
resource endowment and not so much the size of the county and the number of
counties.
The writer is a policy
analyst specializing in devolution and works at the Institute of Economic
Affairs where he heads the Futures Program. This article is part of a series published every saturday by the star newspaper and coordinated by the Katiba Institute. It was published on May 18 2013. For other articles check http://katibainstitute.org/devolution-issues
